Managing a global network of suppliers presents considerable challenges for large multinational corporations. Chief among these is how to effectively transfer knowledge among members of strategic alliances while maintaining tight control over intellectual property. This paper highlights the efforts of a Fortune 100 manufacturing firm (hereafter US Manufacturing) and its management of global IT suppliers. Using a social capital framework developed by Inkpen and Tsang (2005), we explore the supplier network at three levels (structural, cognitive and relational) and present eight proven practices for creating, managing and exploiting social capital within strategic alliances.
INTRODUCTION
This case illustrates the importance of knowledge transfer for successfully outsourcing software development. It details the efforts of a US Manufacturing firm and its interactions with its network of suppliers. It demonstrates the need to integrate the suppliers' development teams into the internal teams as well as the necessary processes and frameworks to facilitate the establishment of social capital and the transfer of knowledge between members of a strategic alliance. This case utilizes the framework developed by Inkpen and Tsang (2005) to categorize and describe eight practices US Manufacturing used in its relationship with its suppliers. This paper will first describe US Manufacturing's four year experience engaging offshore development suppliers, then using the Inkpen and Tsang (2005) framework, will describe the social capital conditions and facilitators evident in the engagement and how those conditions help shape the eight practices.
Case Background and Research Methodology
US Manufacturing is one of over 20 US customer firms studied as part of a larger project that focuses on the lessons learned by US firms who are engaged in offshore development of software . Among the over 20 US customer organizations studied in this project, US Manufacturing showed the most strategic use of knowledge transfer. Before achieving strategic advantage with offshore outsourcing, however, US Manufacturing failed in its initial offshore initiatives. After diagnosing the causes of its initial failures, US Manufacturing remedied the supplier relationships with new structural, cognitive, and relational practices. These practices, which we have analyzed through the theoretical lens of social capital, highlights the importance of actively designing practices to build social capital to ensure successful strategic alliances. Positioning System (GPS) steering system into one of their larger product lines currently in production is a prime example of their motives and methods.
US Manufacturing is a
For this project, US Manufacturing chose a large Indian supplier and placed all employees offshore to take greatest advantage of the labor rates. Specifically, this project required the offshore supplier to design and create the embedded software intended to control the steering systems and interface with the GPS satellites. The project involved new software tools, interface systems and processes for both the SCE and the supplier.
Primarily due to the fact that knowledge transfer was an afterthought, this project failed to produce any of the deliverables outlined in the statements of work and was ultimately pulled back in house and completed well behind schedule and over budget. The GPS project was indicative of the many failures US Manufacturing encountered which were related to social capital knowledge transfer. Due to the project delays, the need for extensive rework to correct inaccurate and incomplete applications, project timelines and budgets were not met and business sponsors were disappointed in the process. Looking back, the manager of the SCE and his staff underestimated the need for extensive domain knowledge transfer (product, process and market) as well as their own expertise in managing an offshore project.
According to the manager of the software center of excellence at US Manufacturing, Despite the failures, US Manufacturing did see some promise in offshore development.
While the projects themselves were not completed, they were confident that the offshore developers might be able to reduce the project backlog if US Manufacturing was able to better share knowledge and expertise with the suppliers. Based on internal process improvements and some improvement of code late in the engagement, US Manufacturing decided to move forward with the offshore model. According to the Manager of the SCE, "I must admit it was a tough sell, but we started to put in place much better systems to monitor our offshore resources as well as our internal teams. Our first few projects and the Six Sigma journey taught us: 'if you can't count it, you can't improve it'. So after some retooling, we tried again."
In January 2004, the SCE used the lessons it learned and re-launched its offshore effort.
Realizing the need for better knowledge transfer, the second attempt was more measured and thoughtful. The SCE realized that the knowledge transfer process for embedded software development was critically important. One way the SCE tried to meet this challenge relates to how the SCE structured the engagements. In the second attempt, most of the employees of the offshore suppliers would spend time onsite at US Manufacturing's headquarters prior to working on the outsourced projects. According to the Manager of the SCE, "What we saw was the benefit and real value of actually bringing those people here for a short time to bring them up to speed. Let them see how an application works and work right next to the team doing the development. That is the real benefit to the teaming aspect."
The first attempt showed US Manufacturing that they needed to spend considerable time and resources in the knowledge transfer phase. The creation of embedded software requires a specialized skill set and manufacturing domain knowledge. In addition to "normal" coding skills, embedded software development requires additional skills not readily available in the offshore space. Inherent in the successful creation of embedded software is an intricate and detailed knowledge of the equipment that will house and interact with the software. Embedded software is much different than traditional software. Embedded software is found in many devices: thermostats, cell phones, cars, elevators, etc. Embedded software is used when any device has to interact with its environment. The "rules" for traditional software do not apply to embedded software.
For example response time, speed, power consumption and correctly interfacing with the external environment are paramount.
Considering the extensive knowledge transfer and training issues involved with embedded software development facing US Manufacturing, they identified the risks associated with employee turnover and the need to ensure continuity of service. To mitigate these risks, US Manufacturing arranged with their supplier to overlap the onshore presence of key personnel. The training sessions were initially delivered by US Manufacturing's architects and project leads to the supplier's project leads. These trained employees would typically remain on site at US Manufacturing for 6 to 18 months.
However, the hourly onshore rates are typically 3 -4 times as high as the offshore rates and the labor arbitrage deteriorates the longer the employees are on site. US Manufacturing's ultimate goal is to have a 20/80 ratio of supplier employees who are onshore versus offshore and to outsource no more than 30% of the development.
However, migrating the trained employees offshore to train offshore employees creates a talent and knowledge vacuum onsite and severs many professional and personal connections that were created. To address this issue, US Manufacturing overlapped the supplier's new onsite resource with the old one for between 3 and 6 months. While this approach is expensive, the two on-site employees were able to establish common frames of reference and transfer relationships and connections to the new employee.
Additionally, the new employee is trained by the old employee, freeing up US Manufacturing's architects and project leads to engage in higher level activities. Once the old employee migrates offshore, they are then able to transfer the knowledge obtained during their on-site time to the offshore employees and capitalize and expand on the intense learning which took place on-site.
The supplier selection and engagement process was also much different in round two for US Manufacturing. The failures in round one showed US Manufacturing that it was critical to establish a long range plan with the offshore suppliers and the communication of US Manufacturing's long range strategy was necessary during the due diligence phase of the engagement. Specifically, the members of the SCE targeted firms that were willing to begin the process slowly knowing that the supplier would need to invest heavily in the knowledge transfer process to ensure success. In round two, US Manufacturing selected two large Indian suppliers that had already exhibited expertise in the embedded software market, primarily in the automotive industry. In addition, they selected a boutique firm that specialized in embedded software in the manufacturing market. This prior experience with the embedded software development process was a critical success factor that was overlooked in round one.
"We really didn't understand how different we (embedded software development) were until we saw the failures in round one. We now know that our vendors need a very specialized skill set and we now know how to identify and test for those skills. We are much better at vendor selection and talent assessment."
The services of the two large suppliers and one boutique firm represented about $3.4 million, or 10% of SCE's annual budget. These suppliers provided about 15 people onsite and 35 people offsite. The three engagements are all increasing in dollar value and headcount. 
Social Capital and Knowledge Transfer
The Inkpen and Tsang (2005) model represents the theoretical framework we used to classify the practices US Manufacturing employed. However, before exploring that model, it is important to note that additional research areas are closely related. Namely, the bodies of literature related to trust, knowledge transfer, social capital cross cultural issues and geographically dispersed teams are clearly relevant. While a detailed discussion of these areas is not within the scope of this case study, readers are encouraged to explore key relevant articles in the following areas: trust (Chowdhury, 2005 and Politis, 2003) , trust and geographically dispersed teams (Trompenaars and HampdenTurner, 1998; Hofstede, 2001, and Jarvenpaa et al 1998) , and knowledge transfer (Hansen, 1999; Orr, 1996 and Tsoukas, 1996) .
Adapting Nahapiet and Ghoshal's (1998) While researchers have focused on various salient issues of group social capital (Oh, et al 2006) , the effects of involuntary employee turnover (Shaw, et al 2005) , voluntary turnover (Dess and Shaw 2001) , the creation of knowledge at the individual level (McFadyen et al 2004) , absorptive capacity (Tsai, 2001) , and external knowledge acquisition (Anand, et al 2002) , this paper focuses on the creation of social capital and knowledge transfer within a strategic alliance. These firms would share a geographical area or market segment.
Strategic alliances however, exist between firms that do not necessarily share a formal hierarchy nor a geographical area and market segment. A strategic alliance "can be formed by firms located in different positions or in the same position in the value chain" Inkpen and Tsang (2005) . Firms enter into a strategic alliance voluntarily with the idea of a common benefit resulting from the arrangement.
It is in the context of a strategic alliance that we adopt Inkpen and Tsang's definitions of both social capital and knowledge transfer. Building on the work by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998), Inkpen and Tsang define social capital as "the aggregate of resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or organization" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005) . In the context of the US Manufacturing case, the connection between US Manufacturing and its suppliers represents a "social capital resource" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005) belonging to both firms.
It is this idea that the connection itself between a supplier and a customer has an exploitable value that was missing in US Manufacturing's first offshore effort. The realization of the value and the practices employed to harness that value was a key success factor in US Manufacturing's second attempt offshore.
Inkpen and Tsang define knowledge transfer as the "process through which one network member is affected by the experience of another. Knowledge transfer manifests itself through changes in knowledge or performance of the recipient unit" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005: 149) . In the context of a strategic alliance, "alliances provide opportunities to create redeployable knowledge such as technical knowledge or market knowledge" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005) . The next section of the paper examines each of the three social capital dimensions and the practices US Manufacturing used to enhance knowledge transfer.
Social Capital Dimensions and SCE Practices
The practices utilized by the SCE at US Manufacturing are listed in Table 1 as they correspond to the social capital dimensions. This classification was made using the transcripts of the interviews as well as Inkpen and Tsang's description of the various dimensions.
Table 1 Social Capital Dimensions and SCE Practices
Each dimension affects knowledge transfer differently and has differing facilitating conditions. "The structural dimension of social capital involves the pattern of relationships between the network actors and can be analyzed from the perspective of network ties, network configuration and network stability" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005: 152) . The structural dimension within social capital relates to the boundaries that must be spanned in order for knowledge transfer to take place (Levina and Vaast 2005) . These boundaries may be spanned by network ties. "The fundamental proposition of social capital theory is that network ties provide access to resources" (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998: 252) . However, in a strategic alliance, the amount of information passing through this boundary can lead to a divulging of proprietary intellectual property or an unbalanced relationship with one supplier. "Ties provide the channels for information transmission, but the overall configuration of these ties constitutes an important facet of social capital that may impact the development of intellectual capital" (Nahapiet and Ghoshal: 252) . This represents a significant risk for US Manufacturing.
To mitigate these risks while enhancing the network structure, US Manufacturing developed three practices for effective knowledge transfer.
Structural Dimension: Practice 1: Utilize multiple suppliers to enhance network ties and to increase social networks
The SCE distributed work among three suppliers (two large and one boutique). While maintaining engagements with multiple suppliers did increase transaction costs and management overhead, the benefits included protection of intellectual property and the creation of a competitive environment to keep costs low and quality high.
The use of multiple suppliers created larger social networks thus increasing US Manufacturing's ability to both create social capital and manage knowledge transfer.
While it may seem counter-intuitive that increasing the number of suppliers would increase the social capital between teams, the SCE found that exposure to divergent engagement models, vendors with different work processes and styles, and vendors with unique expertise, broadened the outlook of the internal employees. Specifically, internal teams were able to enhance their own skill sets and increase their levels of expertise and confidence by working with developers from multiple vendors. This practice is closely related to Structural Dimension Practice 2 in that intellectual property can be protected and the network enhanced by not only utilizing multiple suppliers, but by unitizing the projects.
Structural Dimension: Practice 2: Increase network utilization and frequency by unitizing projects into small segments
The first part of the practice involved the unitization of tasks to be sourced. These tasks were typically 5 to 7 business day activities that had clearly defined objectives and requirements. While the transactional overhead of this strategy was considerable, the Considering the proprietary nature of the software the SCE developed, they faced an interesting problem: how to transfer enough knowledge to enable successful product development while protecting their trade secrets. To mitigate this risk, the SCE (1) unitized projects into small segments of work and (2) dispensed these segments among three offshore suppliers to effectively distribute the intellectual property. They viewed their intellectual property as a puzzle. By distributing small pieces among three suppliers, no one supplier can assemble the puzzle on their own (See Figure 1 ).
Figure 1: Intellectual Property and Network Ties
This model also created a system of both strong and weak network ties between teams.
The strength of a tie is a continuum and is defined as "a combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie." (Granovetter 1973 (Granovetter : 1361 In the case of US Manufacturing, the strong ties facilitated trust, reciprocal information exchange, and performance, while the weak ties facilitated the generation of new information. For example, an internal team working closely on a project with Supplier One, would develop strong ties.
Additionally, that team may also work peripherally with Supplier Two. This created a weak tie with Supplier Two which exposed the team to new techniques, tools and processes. While connections did not exist between suppliers, US Manufacturing teams did interact simultaneously with multiple suppliers, thus increasing network utilization, network ties and the opportunity for knowledge transfer. As Hagedoorn et al (2005) noted, a combination of strong and weak network ties can a positive impact on the firm which was the case with US Manufacturing.
This practice had important impacts on the knowledge transfer process. Specifically, by unitizing the work into small objects, the number of exchanges between US Manufacturing and its suppliers increased thus increasing the strength of the tie while creating multiple connections between them as well (Inkpen and Tsang 2005) .
Structural Dimension: Practice 3. Ensure knowledge retention and transfer by requiring suppliers to have shadows for key supplier roles
To counteract the increased training costs associated with unitization of projects and the use of multiple suppliers, the SCE required suppliers to overlap key people in the engagement. This practice also helped to mitigate the risks associated with supplier employee turnover. (Unwanted supplier employee turnover was as high as 75% in some of the companies studied.) Employee turnover can have a destabilizing effect on a social capital network. As Inkpen and Tsang found, "personnel turnover affects intracorporate knowledge sharing, which often takes place through formal or informal exchanges on an individual basis. Maintaining a stable pool of personnel within a network can help individuals develop long-lasting interpersonal relationships" (2005: 156).
To help maintain the stability of the network, the SCE required that trained supplier employees remain on the account for at least one year after training or the supplier would incur the costs of training a replacement. This facilitated knowledge transfer because relationships were maintained and network stability increased.
For key supplier roles such as project leads or architects, the need to ensure continuity was even greater. US Manufacturing required suppliers to provide shadow employees for key onsite supplier roles. Depending on the role, the required shadowing period was three to six months. This overlap period had two major social capital and knowledge transfer benefits. First, the knowledge transfer was done predominately between the supplier's employees, thus freeing up the SCE's valuable architects and leads. Second, the incumbents were able to ease the impending transition by introducing their replacements to US Manufacturing's business units and staff and subsequently transferring more social aspects of the arrangement. This helped to maintain the social contacts and connections that were created during the engagement. According to the engineering supervisor: Figure 2 shows the relationship between the supplier's onsite projects leaders and the offshore team. The shadowing allowed the social capital (both personal and professional) to be maintained when the supplier's employee then shared the knowledge with the offshore development team members.
"Once we started overlapping the liaisons, our customers felt much better about rolling people off the project. The outgoing liaisons made our job much easier since they took their initial training and subsequent learning and were able to convey it to their replacement much, much better than we can."

Figure 2 US Manufacturing use of supplier employee shadowing
Cognitive Dimension Practices
The cognitive dimension of Inkpen and Tsang's framework encompasses the idea of shared cultural goals and vision. "Shared goals represent the degree to which network members share a common understanding and approach to the achievement of network While on the surface, this practice seems obvious, it did not occur to the manager of the SCE for 2 years. The costs (financial, time, health concerns etc.) often prevent US managers from visiting the Indian suppliers. When the manager of the SCE finally made the trip to Bangalore, India to visit the people he had worked with for 2 years, but had never met face to face, he realized the high value of the trip. During his 2 -week trip, he visited both the large suppliers and the boutique firm.
"I can't believe I waited two years to meet the people I have been only e-mailing and seeing in video conferences! What a difference this trip has made. Now I know my team. I should have done this at the very beginning. I now have faces, and more importantly personalities, to go with names and titles. This trip was worth every penny."
It was not only the meetings themselves which created the connections. Rather, face to face interactions allowed for a level of social interaction that was impossible during teleconferences or email conversations. The individuals were able to have casual conversations about families, shared experiences, even personal goals. Additionally, shared meals and social activities helped to cement the connection between US Manufacturing and their suppliers. These interactions represented "informal socializing ties" (Oh et al, 2004) and, for US Manufacturing, increased the level of social capital. 
"My people were tired of working 60 hour weeks. We communicated that offshore was a way to better manage our project pipeline since we were not going to add a bunch of expensive North American resources to meet the demand and then lay them off later, we had to find other ways of being able to add flexibility to our workforce. And so they are not worried about losing their job. They just see this as a way of getting back to some kind of normal 40 to 50 hour workweek, and even more importantly, as a way for them to move up in their level of responsibility."
Communicating the goal of utilizing offshore as a way of managing the application backlog and not reducing development headcount helped the internal development staff to understand the goals of US Manufacturing and how they would impact their own careers and employment. This created an atmosphere that enhanced the knowledge transfer effort. For example, according to the engineering supervisor, "I was amazed at how open our developers were with the suppliers team. Once they realized that the quicker they [the offshore team] were up to speed, the sooner they could share the load, there was no 'turf' to protect, or 'secrets' to keep. This practice was also evident in the relationship between US Manufacturing and the suppliers. The members of the SCE used an internally developed Decision Support System to actively inform the supplier of upcoming work. By being able to predict future revenue, the suppliers were able to focus developer efforts on production rather than revenue generation. According to the manager of the SCE, "Initially, the developers seemed to have one eye on the current project and one eye on 'what is coming next'. Once we were able to share our forecasts with them, the attention turned to the current tasks."
This supports the work of Inkpen and Tsang. "For strategic alliances we also expect that goal clarity reduces interpartner conflict by facilitating the negotiation and establishment of shared goals. When the objectives and strategies of an alliance are clearly stated, a foundation of common understanding and the means to achieve the collaborative purpose is established among the partners" (2005: 157).
Cognitive Dimension: Practice 6: Integrate the offshore employees fully into the development team.
One way to encourage knowledge transfer is the enhancement of social relationships (Oh et al 2004) . Many firms find it difficult to integrate the supplier's employees into the culture and social systems of their firms. Our research shows that offshore suppliers are often viewed with fear and even contempt. For example, the program managers at one Fortune 100 firm we investigated witnessed open hostility between offshore system administrators and business units who would have never engaged in such unprofessional behavior with internal employees. US Manufacturing made a concerted effort to encourage and facilitate integration.
This integration was not limited to training or knowledge transfer. It helped to create a team atmosphere that lasts even after the supplier's employees are transferred offshore.
According to the manager of the SCE, While the co-training of internal employees with supplier employees creates significant trade secret and intellectual property risks, the SCE felt it was necessary. Due to significant amounts of product and process knowledge the suppliers needed to successfully develop software, and the need to foster common goals among all developers, the SCE chose to co-train both internal and supplier developers.
The SCE provided the key supplier employees with facility tours and training classes on engine architecture, production software, equipment simulation products, operating guides for various lines of equipment, quality assurance processes and an overview of all of the various manufacturing products and platforms. They were introduced to various software development tools, the development environment and embedded development tools.
These classes were delivered on site and in person to the suppliers' onsite employees.
The SCE paid the supplier employees for the time spent in training, but it only paid offshore (versus the much higher on-shore) rates.
For the offshore employees, the classes were recorded and streamed offshore. According to the manager of the SCE: Trust has been discussed widely in the management arena. Specifically, the use of rewards (Ferrin and Dirks 2003) , communication frequency (Beccerra and Gupta, 2003) , trust factors related to offshore development success (Jennex and Adelakun, 2003) , electronic data interchange (Hart and Saunders 1998) , and interorganizational trust (Zaheer et al 1998) has shed light on various facets of organizational trust. In the context of this case, we focus on the role of trust in a network setting. "Trust plays a key role in the willingness of network actors to share knowledge. A lack of trust may lead to competitive confusion about whether or not a network firm is an ally" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005: 154) . To foster the trust US Manufacturing's internal employees had in upper management as well as in the offshore development teams, the SCE analyzed its internal human resource systems and project pipeline to better understand how to manage its workforce. This helped to create a positive "shadow of the future" at US Manufacturing.
Additionally, researchers have identified separate types of trust. Namely, companion trust, competence trust and commitment trust (Newell and Swan, 200) . In the case of US Manufacturing, commitment trust, which is "central in proprietary networks where financial, property, or intellectual rights of the network relationships are at least partly defined" (Newell and Swan 2000:1295) , represented the type of trust needed for fostering knowledge transfer. It was this type of trust which allowed the internal teams to fully engage the offshore teams without fear of damaging their own career goals. By reducing Offshore outsourcing presents considerable challenges to a firm's talent pipeline. The concern centers around the fear that if suppliers are performing many of the lower level tasks (such as routine programming) which historically were used to train future managers, how will those managers gain their skills and expertise? To address this concern, US Manufacturing analyzed their future personnel needs and incorporated those needs into their sourcing strategies. By understanding the advancement of employees within the SCE's talent pipeline, US Manufacturing can better communicate its sourcing strategy to internal employees and maintain flexibility to match uneven demand. To accurately forecast the human resources (HR) demand requires significant knowledge of the HR environment, past HR trends and the current staffing constraints. To manage this process, US Manufacturing created an intricate staffing model which uses as inputs the current and past project staffing data, the current internal talent pool and the projected demand. The rules for the system integrate 10 years of staffing history within the SCE and allow for significant flexibility.
This concern over the "talent pipeline" impacted both social capital and the knowledge management process. US Manufacturing's developers were not worried that they were "building their own guillotines" by working closely with the supplier's teams. Instead trust was established and enhanced by the internal employees seeing a clear and obtainable career path. This trust allowed US Manufacturing's employees to also trust the suppliers' employees. "An atmosphere of trust should contribute to the free exchange of knowledge between committed exchange partners, because decision makers should not feel that they have to protect themselves from others' opportunistic behavior" (Inkpen and Tsang 2005) . CONCLUSION US Manufacturing faced significant challenges in the offshore outsourcing of embedded software development. These challenges were significant enough that their first attempt failed to produce any acceptable deliverables. Moving forward from that failure, they developed 8 practices that facilitated effective knowledge transfer. Using a social capital network model, this paper posits that those practices were effective because they increased the social capital between US Manufacturing and its suppliers. Managing the relationship at the structural, cognitive and relational dimensions allowed the partners in the strategic alliance to increase network stability, reduce cultural barriers, share and understand common goals, and strengthen network ties. 
Social Capital
